Globalization and Taste Convergence: The Case of Wine and Beer by Joshua Aizenman & Eileen L. Brooks
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
GLOBALIZATION AND TASTE CONVERGENCE:









We would like to thank Rob Fairlie, Doireann Fitzgerald, Ricard Gil, Ken Kletzer, Lori Kletzer and Phil
McCalman for useful comments. Any errors are ours.  The views expressed herein are those of the author(s)
and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research. 
©2005 by Joshua Aizenman and Eileen L. Brooks.  All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed
two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is
given to the source.  Globalization and Taste Convergence: The Case of Wine and Beer
Joshua Aizenman and Eileen L. Brooks
NBER Working Paper No. 11228
March 2005
JEL No. F13, F15
ABSTRACT
This paper investigates changes in cultural consumption patterns for a low concentration industry:
wine and beer. Using data on 38 countries from 1963-2000, there is clear convergence in the
consumption of wine relative to beer between 1963 and 2000. Convergence occurs even more
quickly within groups of countries that have a higher degree of integration. A key prediction of
international trade is confirmed in the data: greater trade integration weakens the association between
production and consumption patterns -- although the relative consumption of wine can be explained
well in 1963 by grape production and latitude, these variables are much less significant in 2000.
Despite these "scientific" explanations for the consumption of wine, there is also a cultural angle to
wine consumption. While the relative wine consumption of France and Germany is converging,
several Latin American countries fail to converge. The patterns of convergence are consistent with
dynamics of adjustment in an overlapping generation habit formation model.
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 “THE GERMAN BEER CRISIS -- With Brewery Closures, Germany Faces Brauereisterben 
  
Germany and beer have long been synonymous. But that is changing. With Monday's closing 
of two large breweries, the crisis facing the industry appears to be deepening. An aging 
population is partly to blame. But beer, as it turns out, just isn't cool anymore.”  
 




I.  Introduction 
 
 
  Some globalization naysayers have suggested that it causes the homogenization of 
cultures.  Pointing to McDonalds restaurants and Hollywood movies, they suggest that it is 
impossible to compete against large sunk costs and potentially larger brand values.  However, 
the majority of industries do not exhibit the economies of scale necessary for this alleged 
nemesis of globalization to arise.  The low-concentration industries should illustrate the 
economist’s case for globalization, including increased product varieties for the consumer and 
efficient resource allocation. 
  However, little attention has been paid to understanding the changes in cultural 
consumption patterns for low-concentration industries.  These products and services constitute 
the majority of economic output, and it is therefore essential to analyze these industries to 
learn about the overall impact of economic integration upon consumption patterns. 
  Beer and wine provide a unique product-level case study for analyzing the effect of 
economic integration upon products from two industries that do not have large sunk costs or a 
few dominant brands.  The consumption of beer and wine are examined because their 
consumption is often attributed to different countries and cultures.  For example, tour books 
describe France as a destination for wine drinkers and Germany as a place for beer 
enthusiasts.  Beer and wine are also similar products that act as substitutes.  There are beer   3 
 
 
and wine shops, societies, websites, travel guides, and T-shirt stores.  More pragmatically, 
beer and wine are useful for a study of tastes because the volumes consumed are easily 
measured. 
In addition to an empirical study of international consumption patterns of beer and 
wine, this paper contains a theoretical model consistent with the empirical results.  This model 
builds upon two foundations from the literature: the study of habit formation, and the study of 
culture and trade.    
  Habit formation has been used frequently in two different ways.  The first deals with 
the possibility that individual’s current preferences depend on past consumption patterns, as in 
Pollak (1970).  The second involves “Keeping up with the Joneses” patterns of behavior.  As 
was noted by Duesenberry (1949), keeping up with the Joneses implies that consumers are 
willing to sacrifice saving in order to protect their living standards, inducing downward 
rigidity in the adjustments of consumption to bad shocks.  Variants of habit formation have 
been used frequently in macroeconomics and finance, but rarely in modeling micro patterns of 
consumption.
1  Our model applies a Pollak (1970) variant of habit formation, in an 
overlapping generation model where children’s habits are impacted by parents’ drinking 
patterns.  This modeling choice is associated with the observation that, as the bulk of the 
consumption of alcohol starts late relative to other food items, parental consumption habits 
forms a benchmark impacting future consumption patterns.  
Our presumption is that patterns of alcohol consumption are impacted by parents’ 
preferences, shaping the attitudes and habits of their children.  A convenient way of modeling 
such an environment is in an overlapping generational structure, where the conventional 
                                                 
1 The macro applications include patterns of savings, saving and growth, and the equity premium puzzle.  See 
Browning and Lusardi (1996), Carroll et. al. (2000), and Constantinides (1990).     4 
 
 
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) framework is extended by allowing for habit 
formation.
2  Globalization impacts the opportunity set by introducing foreign varieties and 
modifying relative prices.  Habit formation tends to slow the adjustment to the new 
equilibrium, an equilibrium that shifts the consumption patterns away from autarky.    
This paper also relates to the existing literature on culture and trade.   One such article 
is by Janeba (2004), who builds cultural identity into a Ricardian-style model.   In this model, 
the utility from consuming one of two cultural goods increases with the share of other 
consumers that also consumed your cultural good.  Francois and Ypersele (2002) consider the 
context under which the protection of a cultural good could be Pareto improving.  In a two-
stage investment model, Hollywood has the first mover advantage over local films.  In their 
model, protection is a Pareto improvement: it lowers Hollywood’s fixed investment, allowing 
local film producers to become profitable.  Suranovic and Winthrop (2003) allowed for the 
presence of “cultural externality,” where consumers of a product receive utility from others’ 
consumption of a domestic good.  They showed that such an externality mitigates the gains 
from international trade.  Our model does not take a position on cultural externalities in the 
context of alcohol, as the salient features of wine and beer consumption can be accounted for 
in a model that focuses on habit formation.  Yet, it can be extended to account for any cultural 
features associated with the joy of sharing your drinking preferences with the Joneses. 
Overall, the trade and culture literature that we know of is concerned with the 
dominance of Hollywood movies and other high fixed cost industries.  In sharp contrast , the 
case of wine and beer considered in this paper is not a big country-little country interaction.  
This paper will begin with an analysis of beer and wine consumption data across 38 countries 
                                                 
2 The CES framework is developed in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), Krugman (1979, 1980), and Krugman and 
Helpman (1985).     5 
 
 
from 1963-2000.   During the thirty-eight year time period, we find strong convergence of 
relative wine consumption across countries.  Furthermore, while latitude and grape production 
do fairly well at explaining the 1963 consumption patterns, these endowment effects are much 
less significant in 2000.   We will illustrate that culture continues to matter in the case of Latin 
America.  Finally, we will offer a model of habit formation that is consistent with the 
empirical results.  
 
II.   Data 
  The data were produced by Commissie Gedisteilleerd (Commission for Distilled 
Spirits) in the Netherlands. The consumption of beer and wine are measured in liters per 
capita. We focus on the share of wine consumption in total beer and wine consumption. The 
thirty-eight countries with complete time series, 1963-2000 are listed in Table 1. 
 
III.  Results 
 
III.A.    Evidence of Convergence 
  To begin we look for evidence of taste convergence. In Figure 1, the wine shares from 
all of the 38 countries are plotted for the years 1963-2000. Convergence of the 38-country 
panel is immediately obvious. One characteristic of the data is that countries whose 
consumption is wine-intensive in 1963 become relatively more beer-intensive as time goes on. 
More specifically, the maximum wine share in 1963 is 96.3% (Portugal) and the maximum 
wine share in 2000 is 64.5% (Italy). At the other end of the spectrum, one beer-intensive 
country, Mexico, consumes less than 1 percent wine during the entire forty-year sample. In 
fact, the Mexican wine share actually drops from 0.8% to 0.4% over the time period.   6 
 
 
However, beyond the Mexican exception, the beer-intensive countries are also becoming more 
wine intensive, with the minimum wine share from 1.7% (Japan) in 1963 to 3.7% (Brazil) in 
2000.  
  Figure 2 is a graph containing the sample standard deviation of the wine consumption 
shares across the 38 countries for every year in the sample. It illustrates the strong sigma 
convergence in the panel data. The sample standard deviation of the wine shares is 0.312 in 
1963, and almost halves to 0.167 in 2000. When the sample standard deviations are regressed 
against a time trend, the annual decline in standard deviation is found to be 0.004. This 
coefficient is significant with a p-value of 0.000. 
 
III.B.    Convergence Clubs? 
  Because the extent of integration varies across countries, convergence should be faster 
among certain groups of countries than others.  Table 2 contains the basic convergence 
statistics of the entire group of countries alongside sixteen subsets of countries.  The actual 
countries in each of these groups are provided in the data appendix.   Of the sixteen country 
groups, five groups do not display sigma convergence: German Legal Origin, Scandinavian 
Legal Origin, NAFTA, US-Canada, and Benelux countries.  These failures in sigma 
convergence do not undermine our hypothesis for two reasons.  First, these groups appear to 
have converged substantially prior to 1963, since these groups have five of the six lowest 
country group variances in 1963.  Second, these beer-intensive consuming groups are 
increasing their wine shares significantly over the four-decade period.  This observation 
suggests that, although there might be a slight increase in variance across those countries, the 
group as a whole is converging toward a global equilibrium.   7 
 
 
  In terms of groups that appear to be “already converged”, the following groups had 
under half the variance of the entire sample in 1963:  German Legal Origin, Scandinavian 
Legal Origin, NAFTA, US-Canada, Benelux, and Australia-New Zealand.  These groups are 
very small, with five or fewer countries in each.  They are also geographically and culturally 
linked.   
Other country groups converged rapidly - they reduced their variance faster than the 
entire sample, suggesting that strong within group convergence occurred between 1963 and 
2000.  Those groups were:  British Legal Origin, Socialist Legal Origin, Treaty of Rome 
Europe, Euro countries, OECD countries in 1961, and Developed Countries.  Each of these 
groups of countries has a history of institutions that promote integration within the group, 
such as British Colonialism, COMECON, the European community, or the OECD.  
Somewhat cynically, an alternative explanation for cross group variances is country 
size dispersion, calculated for a group j containing i countries using the formula below: 




















The correlation coefficient between a group’s size dispersion and its sample standard 
deviation is lower than -0.70 in both years, suggesting that the unweighted variance of wine 
shares is negatively related to size dispersion.  However, it is also worth noting that changes 
in size dispersion are not significantly correlated with changes in sample standard deviation, 
probably because the changes in size dispersion are small. 
  Turning the focus away from σ -convergence toward the wine shares themselves, the 
average wine share for the entire sample fell from 34.3% in 1963 to 24.6% in 2000.   The 
most wine-intensive consumers throughout the forty-year sample are those of French Legal   8 
 
 
Origin, and members of the Euro.  The high consumption in these groups is associated with 
the high degree of wine consumption in European romance language countries. 
  Developing countries were the second highest wine consumption group in 1963.  
However, in 2000, their consumption fell to the eleventh highest level of wine consumption. 
This is not very surprising because a liter of beer is, on average, less expensive than a liter of 
wine.  Furthermore, the income elasticity in the U.S. market is higher for wine than beer.
3 
  There is also clear evidence of economic integration in Table 2.  One measure of the 
degree of economic integration is openness, measured as the sum of all exports and imports 
divided by GDP.   The GDP-weighted average of openness of the entire sample of countries 
increased from 0.249 in 1963 to 0.463 in 2000.  In all cases, country group level openness 
increased over the sample period.   
 
III.C.    Predictors of the 1963 distribution – Grape Production and Latitude 
  Although a common intuition could be that cultures dictated wine consumption, the 
1963 distribution appears to have reflected the ability of a country to produce grapes.  For 
1963, high wine shares are positively correlated with per capita grape production in Figure 3.  
The impact of globalization has been to decrease this correlation, since grape production is far 
less important in Figure 4.  In terms of correlation coefficients, the correlation between wine 
shares and grape production is 0.90 in 1963, while the comparable correlation in 2000 is 0.64. 
  Similarly, the latitude of a country’s capital is also a crucial factor in determining 1963 
wine consumption in Figure 5.  In fact, each of the 14 countries with wine shares over 50% in 
1963 has a latitude index between 0.31 and 0.51.  Similar to the grape production case, the 
relationship between latitude and wine shares is less significant for the year 2000 in Figure 6.  
                                                 
3 See Azzam et al. 2004.     9 
 
 
In this case, the apex of the quadratic fit falls from a wine share of 50% in 1963 to 30% in 
2000.  While the consumers in many of the high intensity wine countries decrease their 
relative consumption of wine over time, consumers from many of the high latitude index 
countries increase their relative consumption of wine. 
 
III.D.    Is this a Cultural Matter? 
  The starting point for considering the role of culture in the wine and beer panel data is 
to return to the common perception that the French drink wine, while the Germans drink beer.  
The latitudes of Paris and Berlin, or the 1963 grape production can explain this phenomenon.  
However, anyone that has crossed the border between Germany and France, also knows that it 
is a cultural matter.  The German Bauhaus is a world away from the French chateau.  
Nonetheless, there is clear evidence of convergence in relative wine consumption between 
Germany and France over the past forty years in Figure 7.  The relative wine consumption in 
France falls from 77.7% to 60.7% while in Germany it rises from 11.9% to 15.6%.  This 
convergence also provides evidence of habit formation: despite the fact that neighboring 
countries have had jumps in economic integration, the responses of consumption are slowed 
by cultural patterns. 
  An additional cultural note comes from Latin America.  There are six Latin American 
countries in the data set: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay.  One might 
think that the effect of Spanish and Portuguese occupation would be that Latin American 
countries would be wine consumers.   However, in Figure 8, Mexico, Peru, and Brazil all have 
minimal wine consumption by the year 2000.  The three other countries Argentina, Chile, and 
Uruguay drink a significant amount of wine.   10 
 
 
  This result can be explained by latitude, or grape production.  However, it can also be 
explained by culture.  Latin American countries gained independence in the early 1800’s 
while Spanish resources were distracted by the Napoleonic wars.  Since that time, the number 
of Europeans living in these countries has changed notably.  In Argentina, Chile and Uruguay, 
the share of population that is considered of European descent is 85% or higher.
4  However, 
the share of European descendants is much smaller in the beer drinking countries.  In Brazil 
the European descendants make up 55% of the population, while in Mexico and Peru the 
equivalent share is below 15%.  We will not pursue the reasons for this disparity in European 
descendants; we simply want to note that European descendants may provide a cultural 
explanation for high wine consumption.  However, it may not be a matter of coincidence that 
European descendents live in countries with the latitudes and grape production that increase 
wine consumption. 
Both the French-German example and the Latin American example highlight the fact 
that international cultures reflect the resources available.  The examples also suggest that 
economic integration between countries with different resources will increase the cultural 
diversity of consumption. 
 
III.E.    Evidence of Habit Formation 
  Although many of the above results may seem consistent with a neoclassical model of 
trade, the evidence supports a model of habit formation.  The clearest example of habit 
formation comes from the original six European countries that signed the Treaty of Rome in 
1957.  Europe’s internal market experienced two formal episodes of trade liberalization.  First, 
                                                 
4 This data is from the Lonely Planet Online WorldGuide, http://www.lonelyplanet.com/destinations/, access date 
1/10/05.     11 
 
 
in the late 1960’s, tariffs and quotas were removed.  Second, in 1993, the Single Market Act 
was completed, removing much of the regulation that limited free trade.  Nonetheless, in 
Figure 9, you can see that there is no immediate impact of either episode upon the wine share 
for any of the six countries.  The smoothness of adjustment in Europe suggests that the 
neoclassical model cannot explain the dynamics of economic integration and consumption.  
Furthermore, Mexico is not converging despite the creation of NAFTA in 1994.  Although 
Mexico had a 20% import tariff on wine that was phased out until 2003, the wine share 
remains under 0.5% in 2002.
5 
 
IV.   A Model 
Our presumption is that wine and beer tastes are shaped by habits, income, endowment 
and prices.  Habits are, by definition, backward looking, and may be shaped by parents 
impacting their children’s lifestyles.  We capture these considerations applying an overlapping 
generational structure, where deviations from past habits are costly.  Globalization is viewed 
as the dismantling of trade barriers, allowing the introduction of new varieties.  We illustrate 
the model by tracing the dynamics of adjustment to the introduction of a new variety.   
  We start with the base specification: the utility associated with consumption at time t 



















t i t i t i t X X X a Y ;  , 0 , 1 ; 0 λ γ δ ≤ < <  
where  t Y  denotes the outside homogenous good; i X is the consumption at time t of variety i, a 
is a constant.  The term λ reflects the impact of habits on the utility from t i X , .  Deviation from 
                                                 
5 The data are not complete for the years 2001-2002, however, we do have data for Mexico.   12 
 
 
the habitual consumption, 1 , − t i X , reduces the utility from consuming t i X ,  by a quadratic term, 
2
1 , , ] [ − − t i t i X X λ .  To simplify the dynamics, we consider an overlapping generation 
interpretation of (1), where consumption of goods X, n i t i X , 1 , } { = , is in the second period of life.  
Habits are determined by the parents’ consumption, summarized by n i t i X , 1 1 , } { = − . 
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  A long run equilibrium corresponding to a given price vector is reached when the 
consumption of each variety is stable overtime.  The dynamics of the system can be grasped 
by studying a simple case.  Suppose that starting from a long-run equilibrium with n-1 
verities, the price of each is p, a new variety is introduced, priced at n p .  This may correspond 
to the introduction of a product, or opening the market to foreign imports. The dynamic 
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where  r X  is the consumption level of the representative variety, corresponding to the n – 1 
old varieties.
6  Hence, the long run equilibrium level of the new variety is determined by 
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The dynamics of the system are summarized by the following claim: 
 
Claim 1: 









.   
A sufficient stability condition is  γ δ < .  This is equivalent to the assumption that the 
elasticity of substitution within the sector [i.e., between varieties,  ) 1 /( 1 γ − ] is larger than the 
overall price elasticity determining the substitutability of the sector with the outside good 
[) 1 /( 1 δ − ].   
 
                                                 
6 To simplify, we assume that n is large enough so we can ignore the changes in the consumption patterns of the 
old variety.       14 
 
 
The claim follows from (5).  This equation determines also the speed of adjustment, 
implying that the adjustment is slower the greater is the importance of habitual consumption.  
The dynamics of adjustment are summarized by Figure 10, tracing the dependence of present 
consumption ( t n X , ) as a function of the past consumption ( 1 , − t n X ).  The slope of the line 
increases with the habit formation coefficient (λ), implying slower convergence. 
  A more comprehensive version of our model recognizes that wine and beer are 
imperfect substitutes.  Let us denote by  t k W , the consumption of wine k at time t; similarly,  
t i B ,  is the consumption of beer i at time t.  The utility at time t is the outcome of CES 
aggregation across wine and beer, plus the outside good, allowing for habit formation:  
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It can be verified that the dynamics of adjustment are similar to the ones depicted in Figure 1, 
where the convergence speed is determined by the strength of habit formation (λ).  Our model 
can be extended to account for neighborhood and network effects.  Specifically, as drinking is 
frequently a social activity, affinity of tastes may impact the utility associated with social 
drinking.  Such an extension may explain the patterns of countries characterized by social and 
taste fragmentation, as may be the case in several Latin-American countries.  It may also 
explain the absence of convergence in Brazil, Peru and Mexico.    15 
 
 
V.   Conclusion 
The French drink wine, while Germans drink beer.  This common perception becomes 
increasingly inaccurate as time goes on.  Over the past forty years, the “wine drinking” 
countries are drinking more beer and the “beer drinking” countries are drinking more wine. 
Using data on 38 countries from 1963-2000, there is clear convergence in the consumption of 
wine relative to beer between 1963 and 2000. Convergence occurs even more quickly within 
groups of countries that have a higher degree of integration.   Although the relative 
consumption of wine can be explained well in 1963 by grape production and latitude, these 
variables are much less significant in 2000.  Despite these “scientific” explanations for the 
consumption of wine, there is also a cultural angle to wine consumption.  While the relative 
wine consumption of France and Germany is converging, several Latin American countries 
fail to converge.  The number of European descendants in Latin American countries can 
explain large differences in relative wine consumption.   These results are consistent with a 
model of habit formation in which children derive utility from consuming products similar to 





The countries included in specific country groups are:
7 
British Legal Origin: Australia, Canada, Cyprus, Ireland, New Zealand, South Africa, United 
Kingdom, United States. 
French Legal Origin: Algeria, Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, France, Greece, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, Peru, Portugal, Spain, Tunisia, Turkey, 
Uruguay.  
Socialist Legal Origin: Hungary, Poland, Romania. 
German Legal Origin: Austria, Germany, Japan, Switzerland. 
Scandinavian Legal Origin: Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden. 
Treaty of Rome Europe: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands. 
Euro Countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain. 
NAFTA: Canada, Mexico, United States. 
US-Canada: Canada, United States. 
Benelux: Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands. 
European continent: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, 
Romania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom. 
Latin America: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay. 
Australia-New Zealand: Australia, New Zealand. 
OECD countries in 1961: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States. 
Developed Countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States.  
Developing Countries: Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Hungary, Mexico, Morocco, Peru, 
Poland, Romania, South Africa, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay. 
 
Real GDP and Openness values are from the Penn World Tables by Heston et al (2002) 
 
Per capita grape production is measured using annual production data from FAOstat.  The 
population figures in World Drink Trends were used to create per capita values. 
 
Latitude data is provided by La Porta et al (1999).  The latitude index is calculated as: 
Abs(latitude of capital)/90. 
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  Table 1. Countries included in the study 
Algeria Finland Mexico Spain 
Argentina France  Morocco  Sweden 
Australia Germany Netherlands  Switzerland 
Austria Greece New  Zealand  Tunisia 
Belgium Hungary Norway  Turkey 
Brazil Iceland  Peru  United  Kingdom 
Canada Ireland Poland  United  States 
Chile Italy  Portugal  Uruguay 
Cyprus Japan  Romania   
Denmark Luxembourg  South  Africa     19 
 
 





















All  Countries  38  0.345 0.326 0.249 0.385 
British Legal Origin  8  0.167  0.243  0.179  0.731 
French Legal Origin  18  0.524  0.341  0.298  0.349 
Socialist Legal Or.  3  0.425  0.263  0.396  0.671 
German Legal Origin  4  0.170  0.134  0.296  0.631 
Scandinavian Legal Or.  5  0.074  0.032  0.506  0.532 
Treaty of Rome Europe  6  0.369  0.385  0.369  0.518 
Euro  Countries  12  0.429 0.393 0.356 0.432 
NAFTA  3  0.034 0.024 0.118 0.875 
US-Canada  2  0.047 0.015 0.113 0.927 
Benelux  3  0.129 0.108 0.906 0.705 
European  continent  21  0.318 0.316 0.381 0.350 
Latin  America  6  0.425 0.397 0.202 0.508 
Australia-New  Zealand  2  0.036 0.020 0.333 0.828 
OECD countries, 1961  20  0.314  0.347  0.245  0.488 
Developed  24  0.273 0.336 0.245 0.444 






















All  Countries  38  0.246 0.167 0.463 0.388 
British Legal Origin  8  0.143  0.051  0.368  0.756 
French Legal Origin  18  0.311  0.208  0.589  0.332 
Socialist Legal Or.  3  0.255  0.090  0.809  0.679 
German Legal Origin  4  0.213  0.161  0.417  0.679 
Scandinavian Legal Or.  5  0.197  0.033  0.816  0.506 
Treaty of Rome Europe  6  0.359  0.224  0.718  0.520 
Euro  Countries  12  0.321 0.186 0.730 0.423 
NAFTA  3  0.073 0.061 0.339 0.850 
US-Canada  2  0.107 0.020 0.312 0.921 
Benelux  3  0.248 0.123 1.493 0.704 
European  continent  21  0.274 0.153 0.721 0.347 
Latin  America  6  0.270 0.273 0.387 0.561 
Australia-New  Zealand  2  0.179 0.010 0.490 0.881 
OECD countries, 1961  20  0.264  0.173  0.497  0.516 
Developed  24  0.252 0.161 0.456 0.460 
Developing  14  0.236 0.183 0.492 0.385   20 
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Figure 10: Adjustment to a new variety 
The figure reports the simulation corresponding to 
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